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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR GRAHAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.

EVAN E. STREET and MAX
SIEGEL,

Case No.
7883

Defendants and Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, EVAN STREET

This case has been before the Fourth District Court
since May of 1944. It has been before this court twice.
The first time was on appeal from the interlocutory decree entered by the Fourth District Court. The interlocutory decree was affirmed by this court F'ebruary 15th,
1946. When the remittitur sent this case back to the
Fourth District Court to take the accounting, Judge
William Stanley Dunford ordered that the accounting
be filed, and on September 3, 1946 the defendants each
filed an accounting. Plaintiff filed objections to the acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

countings but the accountings, with very slight changes,
were found by the court to be correct.
The accountings (R. 52) showed $4965.58 as profits
of the partnership, of which the plaintiff would be entitled to one half, or $2482~79, but reduced by whatever
credits the defendants are entitled to. The court awarded
the plaintiff a judgment on the accounting of $2974.01.
If the item of $1932.00 for so-called idle time, which we
will be able to demonstrate conclusively that the court
should not have awarded the plaintiff, the plaintiff would
only have had a judgment on the accounting of $2008.01.
We point to these figures only to show that if the plaintiff had been willing to accept the accounting tendered by
the defendants, and which the court has found to be substantially correct, this case would have been disposed of
six years ago.
Instead of accepting this accounting of the defendants, the plaintiff on September 12, 1946, filed "Objection
to Accounting by Defendants and Supplemental Complaint" (R. 17). The filing of the supplemental complaint by the defendant delayed the hearing on the accounting for the reason that plaintiff by the supplemental
complaint asked the District Court to reject the c:tecounting which had been ordered by this court (R. 21),
and instead prayed for:
"II. . . . damages sustained to date hereof
in the sum of $55,756.00, and for the further sum
of $1271.00 per month from date hereof, until
the said accounting is fully settled."
"III. That the defendants and each of them
account to the partnership of Graham and Street
2
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for drunages sustained for loss of future rents,
issues and profits, in the sum of $88,773.33."
Thus, instead of seeking a probable recovery of
about $2000.00, plaintiff prayed for the total of these
two sums of $1-!-!,5:29.33, plus an additional $1271.00 per
month frOin September 12, 1946. The defendants contended that these proposed runendments to the complaint
by which this enormous sum was requested, were beyond
the scope of the original action and sought a writ of
mandate in this court. The writ was denied, this court
stating that it was the province of .the District Court
to decide what runount should be awarded and then if
plaintiff was dissatisfied an appeal could be taken. The
following is the final paragraph of the decision of this
court (191 P. (2) at 159):
"If, after the final accounting is made, and
a final decree is entered, either party is dissatisfied with the result, we will review on appeal all
questions properly brought before us as to the
merits of the substantive issues. Plaintiffs are
complaining before they are hurt. If they are
aggrieved by any ruling of the defendant court,
they will have an opportunity to have it reviewed
here on appeal from the final decree. But we will
not attempt by mandamus or otherwise to super- ·
vise every stage in the proceedings of the district
court. The defendant court has not violated any
clear mandate from us. It follows that the peremptory writ prayed for must be denied, and the
alternative writ heretofore issued is recalled.
Costs to defendants."
The remittitur from this court on this proceeding

3
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was sent down April 19, 1948. The judgment in this action was ente·red July 12,1952 (R. 121).
This court may be interested in a more detailed
statement of the facts occurring prior to the first appeal
to this court, and for the convenience of the court we attach a brief summary of the facts in Appendix A. We
wish to give the court this background because the·re are
two members of this court who were not on the court
when the other two proceedings were heard by the court.
We recognize that the matters determined by the court
on the first appeal are, of courS'e, res adjudicata, and
present these additional facts only for the information of
the court, and not as a basis for further action by the
court.
THEORY OF THE TRIAL OF THE ACTION IN THE
DISTRICT COURT AND DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT AFFIRMING THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE.

At the conclusion of the trial of this action before
the Hon. Wm. Stanley Dunford, the Judge in entering
his decision commented· on the nature of the action:
"This is an action in which the equity jurisdiction of the court is appealed to to require an
accounting of the partnership alleged to have been
formed between the plaintiff and the defendant,
Evan E. Street." (P ..263 of Tr. of Evidence on
1st appeal.)
The court made Findings of F·act from which it
found that a partnership had be'en formed between the
plaintiff and the defendant,· Evan E. Street, and made
specific findings as to the acts. of each of the defendants
4
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during the existence of said partnership. Insofar as we
deem them material to this part of the brief, we quote the
following Findings (R. 84):
Par. 7:
"That the plaintiff and defendant, Evan E.
Street, worked on the equipment so purchased,
making necessary repairs thereon, until on or
about ..August 16, 1943; * * * that on or about
August 16, 1943, the said equipment was brought
to American Fork, Utah, at the expense of the
defendant Street, * * * that the defendant Evan
E. Street was placed in charge of the equipment
purchased as hereinabove set forth."
Par. 13:
"That subsequent to August 23, 1943, the defendant, :Max Siegel, has collected all moneys
earned in the operation of the partnership equipment hereinabove set forth; that said defendant,
Max Siegel, has paid only the operating costs and
repairs of said equipment and has retained all of
the profits of the operation of the said equipment and partnership business; that the defendant, Evan E. Street, operated the said equipment from August 16, 1945 until January 12,
1945; that the said defendant, Max Siegel still
retains moneys belonging to the said Evan E.
Street, from the agreement of conspiracy between
them, pending the outcome of this action."
Par. 16:
"That plaintiff has requested the defendants,
and each of them, to cease to collect money belonging to the partnership, and misappropriate the
same to their own use, and to deposit the money
heretofore collected by them in the partnership
account of Graham and Street, and that said de-

5
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fendants, and each of thern, ~ave heretofore
neglected and refused, and yet do neglect and
refuse to account for the money collected, and do
continue to conspire between themselves in order
to deprive the plaintiff of his rightfUl interest in
the rnoney belonging to the said partnership from
the operation of the partnership business, and
the sale of the partnership property."
Par. 11:
"That from and since August 23, 1943, the
defendants have conspired to take possession of
the partnership property of Graham and Street,
to collect and misappropriate the funds earned in
the operation of the equipment on the contracts of
Graham and Street, and to exclude plaintiff from
any management and control of the partnership
business."
That Par. 11 continues as follows:
"and have continued to operate the said partnership and business until January 12, 1945."
This finding that "they" operated seems contrary
to the finding in paragraph 13, "that the defendant, Evan
E. Street, operated the said equipment from August 16,
1943 to January 12, 1945." The two fipdings are consistent when it is explained that the equipment was
physically operated by the defendant, Street, while the
business operations of collecting and disbursing the
moneys was handled by the defendant, Siegel.
Approximately one month after the work was commenced by the partnership, and on or about September
20, 1943, the plaintiff, Graham, and the defendant, Street,
went to see the defendant, Max Siegel, at the request of
6
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Siegel. At that time a dispute ensued between all
of the parties as to the ownership of the equipment and
discussions followed concerning the existence of the
partnership of Graham and Street, and the findings continue:
"'That thereupon plaintiff advised defendants
that he would then and there buy the equipment
for the full purchase price plus interest from date
of purchase, or that he would sell his interest in
the partnership of Graham & Street to them.
* * *" (R. 85)
That this court adjudicated that this discussion,
looking to a termination of said partnership at will, did
n~t, in fact, result in a termination -of the partnership
on the date and the court said (R. 442) :
"The evidence is that on September 22, when
Graham learned what Siegel wanted him to agree
to, he said he would hB.ve none of it; that there.
was talk of each buYing out the other; that Street
was willing to take his wages and call it quits ;
that Siegel was willing to take $300.00 for his interest and let Graham have the 'cat,' but no agrePment was reached. Graham thought his interest
was worth at least $1000.00."
The court further stated (R. 442) :
"We do not need to determine whether the
-partnership was otherwise terminated * * *"
and concluded:
"That since Street used property belonging
to the partnership, treating it as belonging to
Siegel, refusing to account to Graham for the
moneys collected for the use· of the tractor * * *
the property will, in equity, be considered as being

7
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used fnr the benefit of the Graham. Street partni~r
ship and accounting of profits required to be
made to this partnership."
Street's misconduct was not in using the property
for other than partnership purposes, for the finding of
the court is that on August 16, 1943, and before there was
any disagreement of any kind between any of the parties,
"The defendant Evan E. Street was placed in charge
of the equipment purchased." (R. 84, par. 7). His misconduct consisted of "treating the sole piece of partnership property, around the operation of which the partnership revolved, as the property of another and dealing
with that other inconsistently with his partnership with
Graham." (R. 442). Street would have split his profits
with Siegel rather than with Graham, since Siegel claimed title to thepiece of equipment (R. 441, reverse side).
"At this meeting (on September 22nd) for
the first time, he told Graham that he, Siegel,
was the owner of the tractor and that he would
rent it to Graham and Street for one third of the
profits." (R. 441, reverse side)
It is to be noticed that by the finding of this court,
Siegel offered to rent the equipment to both Graham and
Street and not to Street alone. This misconduct of
Siegel found by this .court was that he participated in
"this scheme to convert himself from a lender for interest
to an owner and renter demanding profits," and that in
this scheme "he induced Street to join him." This court
held that it would prevent the culmination of such scheme
by holding that "the property will in equity be considered
as being used for the benefit of the Graham and Street
8
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partnership and accounting of profits to be made to
this partnership," and further that although under one
or more of the events that occurred, the partnership
under the ordinary law rules might have ceased to exist,
.. that equity will nevertheless treat the partnership as
existing and require an accotmting of the profits." (R.
-1-12).
Thus, Street's conduct in (1) treating the sole piece
of partnership property as the property of another, and
(2) in joining in the scheme of Siegel to convert himself
from a lender to an owner or renter cost him not only
the profits earned by his labor to the date when the partnership would otherwise have been dissolved, but also the
profits earned byhis labor beyond that date and as long
as he operated the property. :Mr. Justice Wolfe correctly
recognized that the partnership at will might well have
been deemed terminated on May 29, 1944, when the existence of the partnership was formally denied by Street
in his answer to the complaint. This date might have
been the latest date to which an accounting of the profits
would have been required by the general principles of
partnership law, but because of the above-mentioned misconduct of the parties, this court permitted profits to
accrue as long as there were profits. For their delicts,
this court has determined that the defendants shall not
profit, and Street was required to give up profits of his
labor ·for a period extending beyond a date when the
partnership might have been considered as dissolved.
The interlocutory decree, as affirmed by this court, decided that for all the delicts of the parties, the defendant,
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Siegel, was to give up the share of the profits earned by
the partnership equipment that he had claimed, and the
defendant, Street, was required to give up the profits
that were earned by the operation of the partnership
equipment after the date when the partnership would
otherwise have been considered as being delivered.
Because of the delicts of the defendants, a full one
half of the partnership profits were awarded the plaintiff. These profits amount to twice the amount the plaintiff testified his partnership interest was worth when a
quarrel brought about the disruption of the partnership.
This court had found that at the time of the disruption
of the partnership "Graham thought his interest was
worth at least $1000.00." (R.- 422). This defendant is
only appealing from so much of the District Court judgment as awards the plaintiff in excess of $2000.00.
AFTER THE FIRST APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT
PERMITTED THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT
TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW
THAT AN ACCOUNTING OF THE PROFITS 'WOULD NOT
MAKE THE PLAINTIFF WHOLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF
COULD BE MADE WHOLE ONLY BY ALLOWING HIM RECOVERY ON THE BASIS OF RENTAL VALUE OF THE
EQUIPMENT BUT THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED THE
PLAINTIFF RECOVERY ON THE BASIS OF RENTAL
VALUE.

After the r~mittitur was sent down by this court on
the appeal from the interlocutory decree, the plaintiff
filed a pleading labeled "Objection to Accounting by Defendants and Supplemental Complaint." (R. 17). The
plaintiff there requested the court to reject the account10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing of the defendants showing the partnership profits,
eontending that because the plaintiff '•has been deprived
of the management of the said business and of profits
therefrom which would have exceeded the fair actual and
reasonable rental Yalue of the equipment used in the operation of the partnership business," that the plaintiff
should recover, instead of the actual profits that had
been earned by the partnership operation, an amount that
would equal the reasonable rental value of the equipment
that was used in the operation of the partnership business.
The second basis for recovery of the reasonable
rental value was set out in paragraph 10 of this pleading (R. 19):
"That had the defendants been skilled in the
management of the business of said partnership,
and fully accounted to this court as ordered, they
should have made in excess of the fair actual and
reasonable rental value of the equipment used in
the operation of the partnership business."
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
inade at the time of the entry of the final judgment, the
District Court found as follows (R. 117, Par. 6):

"From August 6, 1943 to December 26, 1944,
the use of the assets of the partnership of Graham
and Street, and the conduct of the partnership
business were carried on by Street, assisted by
Siegel, with reasonable diligence, with the exception of 34 days."
This finding negatives the allegations of paragraph
10 of the Supplemental Complaint, leaving only the one
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-----------------------~----------------~----~-~

complaint that "by fraudulent acts of the defendants, he
(the plaintiff) has been deprived of the management of
said business, and of profits therefrom which would have
exceeded the fair actual and reasonable rental value of
the equipment used in the operation of the partnership
business."
The one claim of the plaintiff was that the defendant,
Street, was not skilled and should have earned more
through the operation of the partnership equipment, but
the finding is against plaintiff. It may be that the second
basis of recovery is only corollary to the first, that is,
that plaintiff was more skilled, and if not excluded from
the management, the partnership would have earned
more. There is no finding that plaintiff was more skilled
in this business than Street. The only finding is (R. 118,
par. 16) "The plaintiff, Graham, had experience and
wide personal contacts which were denied the partnership
by the acts of the defendants."
The District Court did not award to the plaintiff a
recovery based on the rental value of the equipment,
and this is the subject of plaintiff's cross-appeal. We
shall leave this point for discussion in our reply brief
if the defendant bases his cross-appeal on that point.
THE DISTRICT COURT ORDERED AN ACCOUNTING
OF PROFITS AS SET OUT IN THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE AND WE AGREE WITH THIS RULE OF LAW. DEFENDANT STREET OBJECTS TO THE AWARD OF ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS AS DAMAGES WHICH WERE
NEITHER PRAYED FOR NOR PROVEN AND WHICH ARE
IN EXCESS OF ANY DAMAGES THAT THE PLAINTIFF
MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE SUFFERED.

12
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'Ye have heretofore stated in our brief that the
accounting made by the defendants and which was filed
September 3, 19-!6, would have allowed the plaintiff a
judgn1ent in an amount of $2482.79, less some credits
which the defendants were entitled to and that this
amount was close to the amoWlt of the judgment that the
District Court has awarded to the plaintiff as an accounting of the profits made by the partnership. The District
Court awarded a judgment in the an1ount of $297 4.01
as plaintiff's share of the profits earned by the partnership during the time of the partnership operation running from .August 16, 1943 to January 12, 1945. Inclu~ed
in this amount is the award of $966.00 to Graham for the
idle time to which we have already referred and which
we shall hereinafter discuss. This award was made dtspite the fact that Graham exerted no effort on behalf of
the partnership after September 22, 1943, and despite
the fact that his complete investment in this venture was
$15.00.
This defendant conceives that the affirmance of the
interlocutory decree by this court required the District
Court to award the plaintiff an accounting of the entire
profit made by the partnership. No objection is made
by this defendant for this action of the District Court,
but objection is made to the following additional awards
granted to the plaintiff:
(1) An award of $1932.00 for alleged idle tirne,
one half of which arnount accrues to the benefit of the plaintiff.

(2) After awarding the plaintiff one half of the
13
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entire profit of the partnership, the coun
granted plaintiff an additional $5000.00 as
damages, though there was neither a pleading
claiming such an amount nor facts to prove
such damage.
( 3) An award of $5000.00 punitive damages, although there was no allegations of facts
pleaded for punitive damages, the only demand for punitive damages being in the
prayer, amended during the trial.
(4) The allowance of interest on the amount
found to be due by the accounting of profits.
( 5) The disallowance by the court of the insurance premium paid by this defendant for liability insurance on the equipment.
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT, STREET, OPERATED THE PARTNERSHIP
DILIGENTLY BUT ERRED IN CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH "IDLE TIME," FOR THE REASON THAT THE
RECORD SHOWS THAT STREET WORKED DILIGENTLY
AT ALL TIMES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.

The court arrived at this amount of $1932.00 in the
following manner: He adopted the testimony of the
plaintiff's witness on direct examination that the rental
value of the "cat" was $773.00 per month and that the
rental value of the "ripsnorter blade" was $193.00 per
month, or $966.00 for both. The undisputed testimony
is that this "ripsnorter blade" had never been removed
from Bothwell's in Salt Lake City, from whom the equipment was purchased, and that there never was any use
for that piece of equipment and that it was never used

14
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by :Jir. Street (R. 316). Thus, if rental was to be cornputed at all it should have been computed only on the
one item of $773.00 per month for the rental of the "cat."
Now as to the facts as to whether there was actually
any idle time. There was no evidence introduced by the
plaintiff to show that :Mr. Street had wasted time or indeed that he failed to operate the "cat" at any time when
he had jobs to do or when the weather permitted, or when
the '"cat" was in operating condition. Mr. Street, however, testified that the equipment was operated continuously and at all times, except when its condition of
repair or the weather would not permit (R. 280).
With the evidence in that condition it did not occur
to either the plaintiff or the defendants that there was
idle time. The first suggestion of idle time appears in
the memorandum decision of the court at the conclusion
of the trial (R. 475.:6). The court there stated:
"A test of the record, in the court's judgment,
justifies the finding that from August 6, 1943 and
up. to December 24, 1944, the use of the partnership assets, and the conduct of the partnership
business, were carried on by Street, assisted by
Siegel, with reasonable diligence, with one exception. There were 507 total days as the court calculates it, during which the court for convenience
will call the partnership period. The equipment,
as shown by Street's records, was idle 158 days
during that period. There were 72 Sundays and
16 other holidays occurring during that time, or a
total of 88 holidays. The longest idle periodt:i of
the equipn1ent, aside from the time when Street
was working upon repairs, occurred in March,
November and December of 1944. There was 36

15
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such days and they are easily accountable to bad
weather. There are those 34 days of idleness
which cannot reasonably be accounted for, except
upon the general testirnony and inferences to be
drawn therefrom, that Street was diligent. While
these 34 days of unexplained idleness must be
cha.Fged against Street, the account kept by him,
with t4is exception, gives indication of diligence
upon his part."
The court should have been impelled to the opposite
conclusion, namely: that if this defendant did not work
on any particular days it must have been because .of the
fact that the equipment was not in repair, or that the
weather was bad, or that there was no work to do, rather
than because of any lack of diligence on the part of the
defendant.
We should like to make the following calculation
showing how the court arrived at these 34 days of idleness and then make a calculation taken from the record,
to show that, in fact, there were no idle days. The court's
calculation taken from the foregoing evidence in tabular
form would be as follows:
Number of days in which equipment did not

158

work---------------------------------------Sundays ----------------------------------72
Holidays ________________________________ 16

88

Remainder
Bad weather days ----·-----------

70
36

Remainder 24
We

resp~ctfully

submit that the following would be
16
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a Uttn·~

r~a~onable

ealeulation to determine whether
there were idle days. Following the exrunple of the court,
we haYe also taken the trouble to carefully check Exhibit
.. N .. and to count the nmnber of days upon which the
equiprnent did not work and he has prepared a complete
calendar eoYering the ntunber of hours that .ftllre ..worked
l>y ~treet, during each one of the days of what the court
has denon1inated the "partnership period," namely,
bet\Yeen Aug-ust 6, 19±3 and up to December 26, 1944.
Counsel's tabulation shows only 1-15 days, including
Saturday, Sundays and holidays, upon which the equipment was not worked, exclusive of the days upon which it
was being repaired. Our tabular calculation therefore
shows:
~-~run her of days upon which equip1nent was
not worked ---------------------------Sundays ----------------------------------72
Holidays --------------------------------16
Saturday half days ____________ 36

145
124

Remainder 21
This remainder of 21 is more than accounted for
by the court's finding that it would be reasonable to allow 36 days for days upon which the equipment could
not be worked on account of weather conditions. Thus,
there is actually no idle time.
One final word should be said to show that Street
was not lacking in diligence and that it is conceivable
that he might even have lost a few days' time by reason
of some illness during these sixteen rnonths.
As to the seventeen days following December 26,
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1944, which was the last date upon which any work was
done by Street, there would seem to be no reason to say
that the time between December 26, 1944 and January
12, 1945, when the "cat" was sold, should be considered
as idl~ time. Street was going to join the U. S. Navy and
w•~e.r.s
the
Roberts testified that Street was trying to
sell the "cat" to him "somewhere around or before Christmas" (R. 322). It was not in very good condition, as the
purchaser of the "cat" has testified. On this point we
should like to adopt what Mr. Mulliner has stated in
Appellant Siegel's brief (P. 37):
"There is likewise no evidence that for the
17 days between December 26, 1944 and January
12, 1945, this equipment was in condition to be operated or that the weather would permit its operation. * * o~<·
"The evidence is, without
couldn't be operated when sold
fact it was only after ten days
costly repairs (R. 325) that
Roberts, could operate it at all,
too cold." (R. 325)

dispute, that it
in January. In
in the shop and
the buyer, Mr.
and then it was

Even if this were to be considered as time that Mr.
Street should hav~ been working, the calculation which
we· have made above shows that he has a credit available
to himself for the extra time that he did work during
the earlier period. We have shown that by allowing
him half days on Saturdays, that in the period to December 26, 1944, there were only 21 d'ays on which work was
not done, whereas the court allowed credit for 36 badweather days, or a credit of 15 days, which can be applied
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against this last period between December 26, 1944 and
January 12, 1945, which period is for just 15 working
days.
We agree with and adopt the argument made in the
brief of the appellant, Max Siegel, as filed ( P. 33-36),
and particularly the points that this charge for idle time
is not an element of partnership accounting or of darnages, and, that if it were, it would have to be pleaded
and proved.
THERE IS NO OTHER LEGAL BASIS OF LIABILITY
FOR THE AWARD OF $5000.00 DENOMINATED AS' COMPENSATORY DAl\IAGES.

In the brief of the appellant, Siegel (P. 24), cases
are cited for the proposition that. no action lies for the
disruption of a partnership at will and we should like
to cite the following additional case of Harris vs. Hirschfield (Calif.) 56 Pac. (2) 1253, which states:
"No action will lie against a third person for
inducing another to terminate a partnership at
will. McGuire vs. Gerstley, 204 U.S. 489, 503; 28
S.C. 332; 51 L. Ed. 581. 7'
The Utah case of Karrick vs. Hannaman, 9 Utah 236 ;
168 U.S. 328; 42 L. Ed. 484, 12 S. C. R. 135, cited at the
same page of Mr. Mulliner's brief, is strictly in point.
In Mr. Mulliner's brief for the appellant, Siegel,
.at P. 16, he states :
"Nothing is better settled than that no cause
of action arises from a mere conspiracy to do
something."
He there cites Moropoulos vs. Fuller (Calif.) 200
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pac. 601 at 604. This case is quoted with approval in
Aaronson vs. Bank of America (Calif.) 109 Pac. (2)
1001:
"The allegations of fraud and conspiracy are
unsupported by any acts stated in the first and
second counts, and standing alone as they do, con~titute pure conclusions on the part of the pleaders, insufficient to charge the defendants with any
wrong."
This doctrine is also approved in the case of Harris
vs. Hirschfield (Calif.), 56 Pac. (2) 1253, which case
also approves the Moropoulos case:
"'l'urning to the final inquiry, a conspiracy is
not actionable unless the conspiracy results i1i ·
the perpetration of:
(1)

An unlawful act or

(2)

Some injurious act by unlawful means.''

In the brief of the appellant, Siegel, cases are discussed concerning the probable liability for causing the
plaintiff anxiety. We should like to point out that nowhere in the record is there any evidence that plaintiff
suffered any more anxiety than any individual does when
he enters into a business arrangement and something
goes wrong with it. Defendant had anxieties, too, in
trying to keep this old equipment going and plaintiff
would have had more of them if he had not been relieved
of this responsibility by the defendant, Street.
The framers of the Uniform Partnership Act h::td
full knowledge of the fact that an excluded partner suffers anxieties, and yet the Act makes no provision for
20
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special da1nages for the anxiety suffered. The Uniform
Partnership .Art states, as we have already mentioned,
that an excluded partner secures the value of his partnership interest and profits attributable to the use of the
partnership equip1nent after he is excluded, and nothing
n1ore. It is a new thought in the law that anxiety furnishes a foundation for legal liability.
\Yhere plaintiff testified that he was "greatly humiliated" by the wrongful act of the defendant, our court
denied recovery for the humiliation suffered.
Rugg vs. Tolman, 39 Vt. 295; 117 Pac. 54 at 55 2 •
:\Ioreover, plaintiff did not plead that he suffered
any mental or physical disorders because of the anxiety,
nor indeed in the pleading did he plead that he had been
caused any anxiety. Since such damages do not ordinarily result from the injury complained of, in this case the
disruption of a partnership at will, the law requires that
such dan1ages be specially pleaded.
See Quermbeck vs. Hanson, 94 Ut. 127, 75 Pac. (2)
1027 at 1029 1 :
"Those damages which are not the probable
and necessary result of the injuries complained
of are termed special damages, and, in order to
recover such damages, they are required to be
stated specially in the complaint. Citing cases
tested hy this rule, the ailments suggested in the
testimony affecting the general health, as well as
the specified health, would have to be specifically
pleaded."
Neither could the court have awarded damages because of any theory that the net profits of the partner-
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ship might have been increased if the partnership had not
been denied the experience and wide personal contacts
of the plaintiff. The District Court itself stated:
"That it is easily conceivable that the net profits of the partnership might have been increased
if the partnership had not been denied the experi-·
ence and wide personal contacts of the plaintiff."
(R. 485)
The court thus recognized that there was no proof of that
fact. Indeed, the court had already concluded that Graham had failed to show that the profits of the partnership were materially and adversely affected by this exclusion (R. 476). Even though the court had not itself
answered this theory of liability, it is clear that ari award
of damages cannot be made on the speculation that the
plaintiff might have made better profits if he had been
permitted to manage this business. See Alder vs. Corsier, 50 Ut. 437; 168 Pac. 83.
A more complete answer to this theory of recovery
is that the Uniform Partnership Act only allows recovery of what the actual profits were and not what they
might have been if the plaintiff had taken possession of
the partnership property and operated it. The Uniform
Partnership Act foreclosed a party from making such a
contention by giving to the expelled party the absolute
right to secure possession of the partnership property
when he is expelled, and if he does not exercise that right,
he is foreclosed from later taking the position that he
could have done better. If he thought he could do better,
all he needed to do was to apply to the court and the
court forthwith would have granted him possession of
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the property. Sec. 69-1-35 (2). (b):
"The partners~ have not caused the dissolution wrongfully and if they all desire to continue the business in the same name, may do so
during the agreed tenn of the partnership, and
for that purpose Inay possess the partnership
property; * * *"
See Crossman vs. Gibney, 164 Wis. 395; 160 N.W.
172.
We respectfully submit therefore that there can be
no foundation for the additional award of $5000.00 as
compensatory damages, the plaintiff having been fully
compensated for his entire loss by awarding him one-half
of fue partnership profits.
THIS IS NOT A PROPER CASE FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

This action is, in form, an action on contract and
not sounding in tort. Exemplary or punitive damages
are allowed in actions sounding in tort. See 84 A.L.R.
at 1352:
"Attention is here called to the cases above
cited and set out under the general rule, holding
that fraud for which no recovery in tort is sought,
will not ordinarily justify the recovery of exemplary damages in an action for breach of contract."
·
On the same page of this report the reason for the
rule is stated:
"The reason of the rule that confines the recovery in suits on contract to actual damages is
believed to still prevail, although we have no
forms of action. If, in ordinary litigation on contracts, issues as to motives and exemplary dam-·
ages to be allowed, the result would be greatly
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to increase the intricacy and uncertainty of such
litigation. The exclusion of such issues in suits on
contract may be justified on the policy of limiting
the uncertainties and asperities attending litigation of such issues to that class of cases in which
the nature of the wrong complained of renders
those issues and evils to some extent unavoid~
able."
On a petition for rehearing in the case referred to in
this report the court stated:
"But counsel assert the right to sue in one
action for a breach of contract and for damages
for a tort, where both claims grow out of the same
transaction and are so connected that they may
conveniently and appropriately be litigated together. Thus qualified, this proposition is believed to be in accordance with the decisions in
this state. But we regard the petition of plaintiff,
insofar as it attempts to allege a tort and to recover damages therefor, in addition to damages
for a breach of contract, as substantially seeking
a double recovery for the same wrong. The real
purport of the petition was to claim damages for
breach of contract, including profits lost by the
breach, and to claim also exemplary damages because of alleged malice in committing the breach."
An action for a dissolution of a partnership, while
not strictly one for the breach of a contract, is nevertheless an action in contract, for the reason that when
an accounting is sought there is an implied contract on
the part of the expelling partner to pay the expelled
partner the value of his interest, and in addition, that
portion of the profits which are attributable to the use
of the property.
15 A.m. Juris. p. 709:
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.. According to the overwheln1ing weight of
authority, exe1nplary damages are not recovera;ble
in actions for breach of eontraet, although there
are dicta and intin1ations in some of the cases to
the contrary. This rule does not obtain, however,
in those exeeptional eases where the breach
a1nounts to an independent, wilful tort, in which
eYent exe1nplary dmnages may be recovered under
proper allegations of Inalice, wantonness, or oppression-as, for exan1ple, in actions for breach
of Inarriage contracts. r nder a ·statute providing
that such damages may be awarded for the
breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
it has been held that they are recoverable in an
action growing out of a breach of contract permeated with tort, where the injured party elects
to waive the contract and recover in tort."
Hobbs vs. Smith, 115 Pac. 347 at 350; 27 Okla. 830,
34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 69:
"But it is insisted that the court erred in submitting the question of exemplary damages prayed for in the petition to the jury; the claim being
made that this case was not one wherein exemplary damages could he allowed. It will be observed that the relationship between the parties grew
out of a contract, wherein. plaintiffs bought and
defendant sold the hogs. Our statute on exelnplary damages (section 2887, Con1. Laws Okla.
1909) reads that "In any action for the breach of
an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud
or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damage, may give damages for
the sake of example, and by way of punishing
the defendant.
"The foregoing statute fixing liability for
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exemplatory damages does so upon those obligations, not arising from contract, and is in harmony with the common law on this subject. 3 Page
on Contracts, Sec. 1572; 1 Joyce on Damages Sec.
111 ; 2 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) c. 20;
Snow et al vs. Grace, 25 Ark. 570; Richardson
vs. Wilmington, etc., Ry. Co., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S.
E. 235; Ryder vs. Thayer et al, 3 La. Ann. 149;
Ford vs. Fargason, 120 G. 708, 48 S. E. 180. And,
although there are some few cases not in harmony
the rule under the great weight of authority is
well established that where a breach of contract
is permeated with tort, the injured person may
elect to waive the contract and recover in tort;
or, differently stated, although the relation between the parties may have been established by
contract, express or implied, if the law imposes
certain duties because of the existence of that relation, the contract obligation may be waived, and
an action in tort maintained for the violation of
such imposed duties."
Utah does not have a statute stating when exemplary damages are to be allowed and follows the common
law rule, but Utah has adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act, which states what is recoverable where a partnership at will is disrupted, and no provision is found
therein allowing exemplary damages. Accordingly, none
should be allowed. Where a statute sets up a rule determining the extent of liability, that. rule of liability is
controlling and exclusive.
If exemplary damages are allowed in this state in actions sounding in contract, then we submit that there are
no facts in this case justifying the award of exemplary
damages. See Tripp vs. Bagley, 75 Ut. 42; 282 Pac. 1026:
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Hln the absence of any aet in reckless or wilful disregard of plaintiff'~ right, or the doing of
any lmnecessary or purely malicious injury to the
plaintiff, we can see nothing in the language used
by the defendant to illdil'ate any wilful intention
to injure the plaintiff."
This case also cites the earlier Utah case of Rugg vs.
Tolman, 39 Ut. 295; 117 Pac. 54 at 57:
''The law does not, and in the nature of things
cannot, allow exemplary or punitive damages for
Inere negligence, although gross, nor for mistakes
that may affect the rights of others, unless some
act or acts indicative of bad motives or an intention to oppress or wrongfully vex and harass another is made manifest."
We think that in the instant case this court would be
justified in stating, as did the court in Tripp vs. Bagley,
supra:
"We find no basis in the evidence for the allowance of exemplary damages."
We make this assertion because we contend that in
the instant case all that happened was that there was an
assertion of a right by these parties which this court
found these defendants did not have.
The defendant, Street, contended that he· had not
entered into a partnership with the plaintiff, Graham,
and the defendant, Siegel, contended that he had not
made a loan to the partnership, but the finding of the
District Court and of this court is against those contentions. There were neither facts pleaded nor proven to
establish that either of these defendants acted maliciously. Merely attempting to assert a right, which the
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court found these defendants did not have, does not justify an award of exemplary damages.
Bracht vs. Connell, 313 Pac. 397; 170 Atl. 297 (1933):
"While appellants were not acting in bad
faith in this transaction, but were doing what they
believed they had every right to do, they were mistaken. The law demands they must faithfully wcount to appellee; but the law places no greater
penalty on them than they give appellee the value
of his interest in that contract, reflected in this
case by a proportion of the net profit after a deduction of all proper charges or costs."
The Utah case of Haycraft vs. Adams, 24 Pac. (2)
1110 at 1114 seems to be authority for both propositions
which we assert, namely: that exemplary damages are
allowed only in cases "where a tort is aggravated by
evil motive" and also for the proposition that where there
110
.
. d gment f or exemplary
are ~ allegatwns
to support a JU
damages that they cannot be allowed. On the first of
these propositions we quote from page 1115 of that case
as follows:
"Exe1nplary, punitive or vindicative damages are such damages as are in excess of the actual loss, and are allowed where a tort is aggravated by evil motives, actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud. Murphy vs. Booth,
36 Ut. 285; 103 Pac. 768 at 770."
On the other proposition that exemplary damages
are not allowed unless pleaded, this case states at 1114.
as follows:
"It is not necessary to discuss either the law
or the evidence as to the matter of punitive damages. There are neither allegations nor proof
28
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to support a Yerdict or judg1nent for exemplary
or punitiYe

drunage~. ''

Even in an action for malicious prosecution our
court found that it could not imply malice frmn the
mere filing of a cmnplaint and termination favorable
to the accused frmn which a motive prompting an intention to injure the accused could be inferred. So, too, in
the instant case, the mere assertion of what these defendants believed to be their legal rights cannot justify a finding that they were malicious in asserting what they believed to be their r~ghts. In this case the only evidence
is that the defendant, 'Street, was acquainted with Graham for a period of several years during which time they
each operated tractors. It even appears from the evidence that Street at various times tried to bring the
three parties together in the hope of working out a solution to their misunderstandings. The defendant, Siegel,
was hardly acquainted with the plaintiff and had only
met him a short time before and there does not appear
to be any basis for believing that that defendant acted
maliciously.
INTEREST ON PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING IS NOT
ALLOW ABLE UNTIL A BALANCE OF ACCOUNT IS
STRUCK.

We only desire to add the citation of one case to the
authorities already cited by the appellant, Siegel, in his
brief on the question as to the date from which interest
is allowable on a partnership accounting. See Harris vs.
W. R. Hart & Company (Okla. 1944) 154 Pac. (2)759:
":Manifestly it would be unfair to allow interest in a cause of this nature. The proceeding
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on appeal reveals that there never was a time !it
which the parties could have concluded that a
definite amount was due. Both parties are now
asserting that the judgment is incorrect. The general rule appears to be that, in the absence ·of an
agreement to the contrary, interest is not to be allowed on partnership accounts until after a balance is struck. 40 Am. Juris. Par. 354."
In the instant case as soon as the Supreme Court affirmed the interlocutory order of the District Court by
its decision in 1946, the defendants stated to the plaintiff's attorney that they would make available to him the
books and records from which a partnership accounting
could be taken and that they would pay whatever amo1mt
this partnership accounting showed to be true. The
District Court has now found that the accounting contained in the books was, with very minor exception, correct. The plaintiff could have obtained the amount of the
partnership accounting in 1946, except for the fact that
the plaintiff then amended his complaint asking, instead
of partnership profits, for a judgment in excess of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00). UndPr
the circumstances in this case it would be inequitable to
allow the plaintiff interest on the partnership accounting,
aside from the fact ·that the general rule of partnership
liability is as we have hereinabove stated..
THE PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING IS PRIMA FACIE
CORRECT.

The accounting that was submitted was found by
the District Court to be substantially correct, but the
court disallowed one item of expense set up in the ac30
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counting, namely: the premiwn paid for liability insurance. The evidence on that point is that the insurance
was for possible liability by reason of accidents occurring by the operation of the partnership equipment. The
evidence is that the item was paid and there is no contrary evidence. Defendants see no reason why this item
of partnership expense should have been disallowed. See
Bracht Ys. Connell, supra:
"Appellants were surcharged with n1any
items for which they sought credit because they
were unable to subn1it vouchers, bills, cancelled
checks and n1eet all the requirmnents of the nwst
familiar proof. * * '" The cancelled checks, corroborated by the testi1nony of the bookkeeper,
who received the bills and made out the checks,
by that of the partner who signed the checks, payroll books showing the auw.unts paid and labor
employed, ·and the trucks used, and all the oth~r
customarily retained records of such a job, are
prima facie proof of the facts therein contained,
and cast the burden of proving such evidence false
on the person who challenges it."

In the instant case, proof was made that the expenditure was made. None was offered that it was not made.
CONCLUSION
This defendant respectfully submits that the allowance of a full one-half of all of the partnership
profits earned during the entire operation is more than
just as an award to the plaintiff. An end to this litigation ought to be reached. Since the accounting is not in
dispute, this court could adjust for the several ite·ms
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which have been disallowed by the District Court and
strike the balance to be paid to the plaintiff, without the
necessity of sending the matter back to the District
Court, and we respectfully urge that action upon this
court.
Respectfully submitted.,

WHITE, WRIGHT &
ARNOVITZ,
Attorneys for Appellant,
Evan E. Street.
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APPENDIX A

On August 6, 1943 the plaintiff and defendant,
Street, entered into an agreement wherein they agreed
to purchase certain equipment from the Bothwell Construction Company for the sum of $4500.00 if they could
get someone to finance the purchase and after they
made the purchase that they would operate the equipment in a sort of joint venture, with the defendant Street
physically operating the equipment and receiving $1.50
an hour for his labor; that all operating expenses and
repairs should be paid, and that any profit left was to
'be divided equally. Of course, the joint venture would
also be required to pay the party who advanced the
money on behalf of the joint venture, along with interest
on that loan. Street· had on other occasions transacted
business with Siegel and was acquainted with him, and
Street suggested that he and Graham attempt to secure
a loan from 'Siegel in order to purchase the equipment.
Accordingly, Graham and Street went to Siegel's place
of business and inquired whether he would be interested in making a loan in the amount of $4500.00 for
the purchase of this equipment.
Mr. Siegel's evidence on the trial of this action was
that he refused to make a loan for the full amount of
the purchase price, hut that he agreed to purchase the
equipment. and then would enter into an agreement
with Graham and Street for the operation of the equipment. Btreet agreed that this was the arrangement
made with Siegel, but Graham testified that Siegel
had agreed to make a loan for the full purchase price
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of $4500.00, and that in addition to the securing of the
equipment purchased Graham was to give security on
a truck of his, and Street was to give security on a
house trailer of his. The court found the facts to be 38
Graham testified and held that Siegel had made a loan
in the amount of $4500.00, secured by a mortgage on the
equipment purchased and by Graham's truck and Street's
house trailer.
No such mortgage was ever recorded for the simple
reason that Graham signed a mortgage form in blank,
and Street had signed another mortgage form in blank.
At any rate the finding of the District Court, affirmed by this court ,was that a loan in the amount of $4500,00
had been made by Siegel, secured by mortgage.
After Graham and Street had entered into an arrangement to purchase the equipment from the Bothwell Construction Company and after some arrange.
ments had been made with 'Siegel to finance the purchase
of this equipment, the Bothwell Construction Company
delivered a bill of sale to Siegel naming Graham as the
purchaser of the equipment. Siegel refused to pay the
$4500.00 to the Bothwell Construction Cmnpany until
the bill of sale was changed naming himself as the
purchaser of the equipment.
The equipment was purchased on August 6th and
Street worked on the equipment to get it repaired, and
it was ready to operate on or about August 16th. Street
had the equipment moved on to some jobs and commenced to work. However, Siegel had not yet completed his agreement with Graham and Street undei
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the terms of which the equipn1ent would be leased to
Grahrun and Street. Siegel tried on various occasions
to haYe Grahmn and Street conte into his office and
conclude this agreeruent, but it was not tmtil Septmnber
~0, 1943, that Gralrrun consented to come to see Siegel.
On Septernber ~0, 1943, Siegel had a disagreement with
Graham, Grahan1 contending that their transaction was
complete, that he and Street had sigried a note· and
mortgage for the sum of $4500.00, bearing 9 per cent
interest, and therefore that he and Street were entitled
to the possession of this equipment. Street disagreed
with Graham and stated that all he wanted was to get
his wages for the tirne that he had been operating the
equipment. According to Graham's pleading, on September 20, 1943, Siegel notified Graham that he (Siegel)
was the sole owner of the equipment (Tr. 133 of evidence on trial prior to interlocutory order).
Between August 16, 1943 and September 22, 1943,
Street operated this equipment under what Street and
Siegel believed to be an agreement whereby Siegel leased
the equipment to Graham and Street, under which lease
each of the parties was to receive one-third of the net
earnings. However, Graham contended that the equipment was operated by Street as a member of the Graham
and Street partnership, which owed $4500.00 to Siegel
for the equipment and which partnership was to operate the equipment on an equal division of the profits.
The court held with Graham's view and held that a
partnership had been organized between Graham and
Street; that Siegel was only entitled to the repayment
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of his $4500.00, plus interest at 9o/o per annrnn.
Graham had made no contribution to the partner
ship other than to advance the su:nl of $15.00 for movin~
the equipment from one of the first jobs in Americar
Fork to another job. Graham never operated the equip.
ment and after September 22, 1943, Street informed
Graham that there was no partnership agreement between himself and Graham. Street continued to operat€
this equipment under what he believed to be a leas€
from Siegel and continued to operate it until sometime
in December, 1944, when he was getting ready to enter
the United States Navy.
Siegel had contended that no agreement had been
concluded with Graham and Street because of Graham's
failure to meet with Siegel and Street to conclude the
execution of the necessary papers. Siegel retained the
title certificate belonging to Graham until after the
meeting of September 23, 1943, and within a few days
thereafter he returned the title to Graham's truel( to
Graham, advising him that he was returning it for the
reason that Graham had not concluded the agreement
with Mr. Siegel for the operation of the equipment.
From September 22, 1943 forward Graham had nothing
at all to do with the operation of the equipment or
securing jobs, nor did he ever contribute to the partner~hip anything more than the $15.00 which he paid to
move the equipment which is mentioned above.
When this disagreement occurred on September 22,
1943, Graham testified that he had stated: "I wouldn't
want any more to do with his set up and that I would
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immediately start arrange1nents to dissolve with Stre,_•t
because I didn't like the idea of it at all, and Mr. Street
if he was dissatisfied that the thing to do was to quit
and we left with that understanding." (Tr. 33 of the
evidence on trial prior to interlocutory order).
Grahan1 further testified that within a week after
September :2:2, 1943: "'I demanded of Street an accounting of what work had been done and what the 'cat' had
earned, and was flatly refused. Told me as far as he was
concerned and :Max that he didn't think that it was any
of my business." (Tr. 44 of the evidence on trial prior
to interlocutory order).
The District Court and this court held that these
facts did not show a dissolution of the partnership at
will and that the partnership must be considered to have
been operated for the benefit of Graham and Street.

37
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

